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The Ethics of Unbranding
Jeremy N. Sheff'
ABSTRACT
This Essay explores the ethical implications of the
phenomenon of "unbranding" that has recently been discussed in
popular and scholarly literature. It compares two extant definitions
of unbranding and examines each under alternative ethical theories
of trademark law, specifically deontological and consequentialist
theories. With respect to each of these theories, the Essay
examines the ethical questions raised by the existence of
asymmetric information between brand owners and consumers.
This includes asymmetries not only with regard to information
about products, but also with regard to information about consumer
decision-making processes. The latter asymmetry presents
conflicts between deontological and consequentialist conclusions
regarding the ethics of unbranding, requiring that one system be
preferred over the other. The Essay concludes by arguing that
consequentialist theories provide the most conventional approach
to the problem of unbranding, but that the potential sense of
dissatisfaction with consequentialist prescriptions regarding
unbranding suggests that there may be an opening for a novel,
autonomy-based deontological approach to trademark theory.
Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. This Essay grew
out of a talk delivered on November 5, 2010, as part of a symposium at Fordham Law
School entitled: Is Silence Golden? Ethics and Intellectual Property Law, hosted by the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal. The Essay
incorporates some introductory comments from Professor Susan Scafidi, the moderator of
the panel on "The Rise of Unbranding in Trademark Law," and is informed by the
discussion among the panelists, including Professor Scafidi as well as Professors Rebecca
Tushnet and Eric Prager. Special thanks are due to the student organizers of the
symposium-in particular Benjamin Arrow and Sarah Yood. This Essay has also
benefited from conversations with Professors Marc DeGirolami, Laura Heymann, Mark
McKenna, Mark Movsesian, Michael Perino, and Adam Zimmerman. All errors are the
author's alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Unbranding appears to be trending upwards lately, at least
according to one definition of "trend."' The name "unbranding"
has been used to describe two very different phenomena, each of
which raises distinct ethical concerns. The first, and probably most
prevalent, definition of unbranding refers to "the practice of
eliminating or selectively reducing the use of a brand in response
to unfavorable consumer opinion." 2 Examples include rebranding,
See Nicholas Kristof, TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2010, 2:18 PM),
http://twitter.com/NickKristof/statuses/24698130645 ("[I]n journalism, the plural of
anecdote is trend . . . ."); see also Clint Hendler, TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2010, 2:25 PM),
http://twitter.com/clinthendler/status/24698613619 ("How does a journalist count to
three? One, two, trend."). These quips are responses to the "bogus trendspotting"
critiques of fellow journalists by media critic Jack Shafer. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Bloggy
Monday, SLATE.COM (Aug. 11, 2003), http://www.slate.com/id/2086882 ("Whenever I
read the words 'emerging trend' in a news story, I reach for my revolver. Most
trendspotting articles-especially those appearing in newsless August-are bunk."). See
generally Mallary Jean Tenore, How Slate's Jack Shafer Calls Out Bogus Trend Stories,
POYNTER.ORG (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/making-sense-of-
news/105778/how-slates-jack-shafer-calls-out-bogus-trend-stories.
2 Aaron K. Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, & Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 3 (2010); see also Cassi G. Matos, Note, The Unbranding of Brands:
Advocating for Source Disclosure in Corporate America, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1307, 1309 (2010) ("An unbranded object, simply defined, is anything
'not marked with the owner's mark' or 'not sold under a brand name."').
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such as the transformation of Phillip Morris into Altria,3 and sub-
branding, such as the launch of 15th Avenue Coffee & Tea-a
local caf6 "inspired by" its corporate owner, Starbucks.4 I Will
refer to this form of unbranding as "concealment unbranding," as
its primary purpose appears to be concealing the well-known
source of a product or service.
A second and more recent definition of unbranding arises from
a marketing strategy in which companies seek to undermine the
image of their competitors' brands. Simon Doonan of the New
York Observer noticed that reality television phenomenon Nicole
"Snooki" Polizzi of MTV's Jersey Shore had gone from carrying a
Coach handbag everywhere she went to changing from one luxury
handbag to another nearly every time she was seen in public.5 He
reported a rumor that various luxury houses were sending their
competitors' bags to Snooki as gifts, in the hopes that her d6class6e
image would rub off on these competitors' brands, diminishing
their luxury cachet. 6  I will refer to this type of unbranding as
"sabotage unbranding," as its primary purpose appears to be to
undermine a competitor's brand image by placing the brand in
observable real-world contexts that are inconsistent with that
image.
The topic of this Essay is the ethical status of these two types
of marketing tactics. Clearly, each will raise separate and distinct
ethical concerns. Concealment unbranding implicates ethical
obligations between the brand owner and the consumer; sabotage
unbranding implicates ethical obligations among competitors and
between each competitor and the consumers over whom they are
Top 10 Worst Corporate Name Changes: Call Me Altria, TIME.COM (Feb. 8, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/printout/0,29239,1914815_1914808_19146
86,00.html ("To distance itself from a number of publicity nightmares ... Philip Morris
Co. Inc., makers of cigarette brands like Marlboro and Chesterfield, changed its name to
the anodyne Altria Group."). For additional examples, see Perzanowski, supra note 2, at
10-14; see also Matos, supra note 2, at 1324, 1331-38.
4 Melissa Allison, Starbucks Tests New Names for Stores, SEATTLE TIMES, July 16,
2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009479123
starbucksl6.html; see also Perzanowski, supra note 2, at 14-16; Matos, supra note 2, at
1321, 1324, 1336-37.
5 Simon Doonan, How Snooki Got Her Gucci: The Dirt on Purses, N.Y. OBSERVER
(Aug. 17, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://www.observer.com/2010/culture/pricey-landscaping.
6 Id.
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competing. Moreover, the nature of these ethical obligations will
depend on the ethical system we choose to adopt and the sources of
whatever ethical obligations arise under that system. Because the
phenomenon of unbranding raises such a diverse set of issues, it is
a useful entr6e to the ethical analysis of trademark law more
generally.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I
discusses the choice of ethical systems-in particular, the choice
between deontological and consequentialist ethical systems-and
the relevance of each system to trademark law. Part II identifies
features of the unbranding scenarios discussed above that might be
useful targets of ethical analysis. I argue that the most appropriate
target for such analysis is the problem of asymmetric information
between persons in trademark-related interactions. Notably, such
asymmetry may arise not only with respect to the subject of
exchange between buyers and sellers, but with respect to the
knowledge of each party and the process by which parties decide
what transactions to enter into. Part III applies each of the two
ethical systems identified in Part I to the information asymmetries
discussed in Part II and finds that each unbranding scenario
presents a potential conflict between deontological and
consequentialist ethical prescriptions. The Essay concludes with a
discussion of the implications of these conflicts for trademark law
generally.
I. DEFINING THE ETHICAL SYSTEM
There are two broad categories of ethical systems or
approaches that might be used to analyze unbranding. One is the
7 This is, obviously, a gross oversimplification. As the sources cited in this Part
make clear, there is vibrant debate in moral philosophy as to the propriety and the
limitations of this dichotomization of normative ethical thought. In particular, the aretaic
approach to ethics-derived from the philosophy of Aristotle and embodied in the
modem philosophical program known as virtue ethics-has recently begun to challenge
the two dominant ethical systems, winning a few adherents in the legal academy. See
generally Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2010), http://plato.stanford.edularchives/win2010/entries/ethics-
virtue; ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE
(Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2007); Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue
Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).
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deontological approach, the ethical system that defines the
rightness or wrongness of an action based on fundamental
principles that examine the action itself.8 Immanuel Kant is, of
course, the paragon of this school,9 while John Locke set forth the
foundational deontological theory of property.10  The second
approach is the consequentialist ethical system, the system that
looks at the rightness or wrongness of an action or practice based
on the desirability of the effects that it produces." Utilitarianism,
as reflected in the moral philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill, is the most well-known consequentialist ethical
systeml2 and is familiar to most of us now as a precursor of the law
and economics movement.13  As lawyers or policymakers
concerned with the ethics of particular trademark practices, it is
incumbent on us to determine which of these systems we believe is
better suited to analyzing such practices.
On the deontological side of the ledger, Professor Mark
McKenna's work is instructive. 14  His documentation of early
trademark law's origins in the "natural rights" traditions of English
common law and nineteenth-century American jurisprudence
Because the deontological and consequentialist approaches are fairly well-developed in
the existing literature on market regulation but the virtue ethics approach is not-and
because I have no special expertise in moral philosophy in general, to say nothing of
virtue ethics in particular-i will indulge in this oversimplification for purposes of this
Essay, while freely admitting to the limitations it imposes on my analysis.
See generally Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fa112008/entries/ethics-deontological.
9 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS; ON
A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE BECAUSE OF PHILANTHROPIC CONCERNS (James W. Ellington
trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785).
10 See generally 5 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690).
" See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edularchives/fall2008/
entries/consequentialism.
12 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1998) (1861); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789).
13 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L.
REv. 961, 977-998 (2001) (describing welfare economics and its relationship to
utilitarianism).
14 See generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007).
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suggests that we might think of trademark law as a deontological
ethical system unto itself. Taking the American perspective in
particular, trademark law has evolved out of the law of unfair
competition, a body of doctrine that purported to set off-limits
certain tactics for peeling customers away from one's
competitors-passing off being the leading example. Under this
view, there are some ways of competing-defrauding or deceiving
the mark owner's potential customers-that are by their very
nature unfair (that is, out of line with "commercial morality"), 16
and therefore illegal. 17 Following Lockean principles, trademark
rights so conceived are circumscribed so as to protect the mark
owner's labor while ensuring that his rights do not interfere with
an equal right in others. 18
While deontological theories may lurk in the background of
some modem trademark doctrines,19 they are rarely overtly
invoked these days. The modem focus, rather, is on protecting
consumers from confusion. The existence of such confusion,
while originally a matter of proving the harm of trademark
infringement, 2 0 has become our definition of the harm itself.21
15 Id. at 1860-63.
16 Id. at 1860-61 (quoting HERBERT SPENCER, The Morals of Trade, in ESSAYS 324,
338 (D. Appleton & Co. 1865)).
17 Id. at 1858 ("The defendant's fraud or deception was what made some attempts to
divert improper.").
18 Id at 1873-93 & nn.156-57. The qualification that requires the rights of persons
other than the putative property owner to be preserved notwithstanding the grant of
property rights is a fundamental challenge to deontological approaches to intellectual
property rights in general and trademark rights in particular. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon,
A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1583-91 (1993).
19 See, e.g., Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, Part III.C, 96 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming Feb. 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=1798867; Mark A.
Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 181-84 (2010);
Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 592-618 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The
Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478-84
(2005); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 162-67 (2005); see generally Gordon, supra
note 18.
20 McKenna, supra note 14, at 1857 ("[P]laintiffs in these [early trademark] actions at
law were not vindicating the rights of consumers-they were making claims based on
injuries to their own interests that resulted indirectly from deception of consumers.").
21 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (imposing liability against uses of trademarks
that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
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This shift in emphasis, in turn, has shifted trademark theory away
from deontological rationales and toward consequentialism. In
particular, the currently dominant law-and-economics theory of
trademark protection22 encourages us to determine whether
particular uses of trademarks either increase or decrease the
efficiency of consumer markets. 23 While many commentators-
myself included--question whether current trademark doctrine
produces the efficiency promised by Chicago School theory, 24
rather few contemporary scholars approach trademark law from a
non-consequentialist perspective. 25
Given this history, it may be that both of these types of ethical
approaches-the deontological and the consequentialist--could be
profitably applied to trademark law. But a problem will arise to
the extent that the two ethical systems appear to give us conflicting
answers as to the ethics of a particular trademark-related practice.
When such a conflict arises, it raises classic questions of ethics: is
it logically possible to do "the wrong thing" for "the right reasons,"
and if so, is it morally justifiable to do so? This type of dilemma
was recognized even in Kant's day, in the famous "murderer at the
door" hypothetical.26 In trademark law, similar dilemmas have
connection, or association of [the defendant] with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant's] goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person").
22 The theoretical dominance of economic approaches to trademark law has been
widely noted by myself and others. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 14, at 1844-49
(collecting commentary of various trademark scholars on the issue); Jeremy N. Sheff,
Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1245, 1249-54 (2011).
23 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECoN. 265 (1987); Nicholas S. Economides, The
Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988).
24 In previous work I have critiqued the conclusion of Chicago School commentators
that modem trademark doctrine tends toward economic efficiency. See generally Sheff,
supra note 22. I am hardly the first person to raise this form of critique. See, e.g., Glynn
S. Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-97
(1999); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
25 For notable exceptions, see generally Gordon, supra note 18; Laura A. Heymann,
The Public's Domain in Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer,
43 GA. L. REv. 651 (2009); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
UCLA L. REv. 621 (2004).
26 Of course, Kant denied that this hypothetical presented the dilemma his antagonists
claimed. Compare BENJAMIN CONSTANT, DES MACTIONS POLITIQUEs 36 (1797) (Jean-
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been obliquely raised by various scholars, typically in the context
of critiquing particular trademark doctrines as indulging fuzzy
deontological notions of trademark rights in ways that generate
undesirable consequences.27 The remainder of this Essay asks
whether the practice of unbranding raises a similar dilemma, and if
so which ethical system should be favored over the other in the
unbranding context.
II. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
To understand how such a dilemma could arise, I propose that
we begin by examining the ethics of unbranding through the lens
of asymmetric information. It is a fundamental fact that parties to
a transaction are likely to have different levels of information
about the subject matter of their exchange. The simplifying
assumptions of neoclassical economics aside,28 there is no real-
world transaction in which both parties have perfect and complete
information. Asymmetry of information with regard to, say, a
product being bought and sold obviously creates an opportunity for
the party with greater information to take advantage-to benefit at
the expense of the party with lesser information. One might
characterize a transaction completed under these circumstances as
offensive to a deontological principle of equality, or to a
consequentialist principle of welfare maximization-that is, as
Marie Tremblay ed. 2003) available at http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/constant
benjamin/des reactionspolitiques/reactionspolitiques.pdf ("Le principe moral, par
exemple, que dire la v6rit6 est un devoir, s'il 6tait pris d'une maninre absolue et isolde,
rendrait toute socidt6 impossible. Nous en avons la preuve dans les consdquences trds
directes qu'a tir6es de ce principe un philosophe allemand, qui va jusqu'd pr6tendre
qu'envers des assassins qui vous demanderaient si votre ami qu'ils poursuivent n'est pas
rdfugid dans votre maison, le mensonge serait un crime."); with KANT, supra note 9, at
63-68 (disputing the formulation and the causal reasoning of Constant's "assassins"
hypothetical, and reaffirming the duty to refrain from making intentionally untrue
statements where a statement cannot be avoided, even if harm to particular individuals
may result).
27 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR 29-30 (3d ed. 1953); see generally George J. Stigler, Perfect
Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957) (describing the
historical development of the theory of perfect competition in economics, and of the
assumptions-including assumptions about the knowledge possessed by economic
actors-on which the theory depends).
990
ETHICS OF UNBRANDING
unfair or inefficient. It is therefore notable that the law does not
consider asymmetric information an absolute evil. In general, we
accept the fact that there is going to be asymmetric information in
transactions, subject to certain exceptions.
Contract law provides a clear example. The parties to a
contract may have differing levels of information about the subject
matter of their agreement, and yet that asymmetry in and of itself is
insufficient to determine whether the disadvantaged party will be
entitled to relief as a result of the asymmetry.29 Thus, unilateral
mistake of fact, standing alone, is not grounds for avoiding
performance of a contract. 30  However, if the party with greater
information could somehow be said to be responsible for his
counterparty's mistaken belief-if he knew of it and failed to
correct it, or worse, if he created it through his own
misrepresentation or concealment of the facts-then the mistaken
party could be entitled to relief.31 So there must be something
beyond the mere fact of asymmetric information about the subject
of exchange-something that goes to the relationship between the
parties-that makes the asymmetry problematic or unproblematic
from the point of view of contract law.
In securities law, we see a similar ambivalence about
asymmetric information. In general, we think that curing such
asymmetry is precisely what securities markets are for. Large,
liquid markets on transparent public exchanges use the price
mechanism to efficiently disseminate relevant private information
about the subject of exchange.32 But there is a category of
informational advantage-material inside information-that we
apparently think shouldn't be tolerated in securities markets, and
29 See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 194 (1817) ("The question in
this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence
the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the
vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor? The court is of opinion
that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the
contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally
accessible to both parties. But at the same time, each party must take care not to say or
do any thing tending to impose upon the other.").
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153-54 (1981).
31 Id. §§ 153(b), 159-64.
32 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 4 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 524-28
(1945).
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we outlaw insider trading accordingly. 33 Again, information
asymmetry in itself is not problematic, but when combined with
some other factor going to the relationship between seller and
buyer it may become so.
In each of these two spheres, commentators have offered both
consequentialist and deontological analyses of the relevant legal
doctrines.34 In deontological analysis, we typically look at the
innocence or fault of the parties with respect to the existence of the
asymmetry: has the party with greater knowledge knowingly (or
perhaps negligently) created or perpetuated his counterparty's
informational disadvantage? 35  In consequentialist analysis, we
typically look to the costs of acquiring or transferring information:
would holding the more informed party liable (or excusing the less
informed party) generate incentives that lead to diminished
production or dissemination of socially valuable but costly
information?36
These two areas of law are a useful prelude to thinking about
the ethical dimensions of trademark law, for two reasons. The first
is that in the contract literature, the conclusions of deontological
and consequentialist analyses largely agree, whereas in the insider
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2011).
34 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 57-84 (1981) (deontological
analysis of contract doctrines that deal with mistake and fraud); Anthony T. Kronman,
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978)
(economic analysis of unilateral mistake and the duty to disclose in contract law); Alan
Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law ofInsider Trading, 78 TEx. L. REV.
375 (1999) (deontological analysis of insider trading law); Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's
Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993)
(same); Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983) (economic analysis of insider trading); Hayne E. Leland,
Insider Trading: Should It Be Prohibited?, 100 J. POL. EcoN. 859 (1992) (same).
3 See FRIED, supra note 34, at 62-63, 77-85; Scheppele, supra note 34, at 155-63;
Strudler & Orts, supra note 34, at 409-19. Whether the better informed party is
responsible for creating his own informational advantage is a separate question-
deontological accounts generally do not require a better informed party to disclose
information that the less informed party has equal access to, or information that the better
informed party undertook significant effort and risk to obtain in the reasonable
expectation of a return on his investment. See FRIED, supra note 34, at 82-84; Scheppele,
supra note 34, at 162-63; Strudler & Orts, supra note 34, at 414-19.
36 See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 34, at 32-33; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 34, at
866-68. Alternatively, some consequentialist accounts may examine the amount and
distribution of wealth generated by a particular choice of rule. See, e.g., Carlton &
Fischel, supra note 34, at 869-72; Leland, supra note 34, at 876-85.
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trading literature, they differ. 37  Thus, there must be some
difference between the two fields that makes the choice of an
ethical system determinative. We might therefore ask what that
difference is, and whether it correlates with some feature of
trademark-related transactions that distinguishes them from
negotiated bilateral transactions on the one hand or impersonal
exchange-based transactions on the other.
The search for such a correlation provides the second reason
why the contract and securities law examples are a useful prelude
to the ethical analysis of unbranding. I propose that such a
correlation does in fact exist, and that it too hinges on a kind of
information asymmetry. This asymmetry has to do not with the
parties' knowledge concerning the subject of exchange, but rather
their knowledge concerning one another. In particular, the areas of
law examined in this Part deal with situations where one party has
superior information, not only about the subject of exchange, but
also about the knowledge, position, and decision-making processes
of both parties to the exchange.
In the contract example, it is not superior knowledge about the
subject of exchange that makes a contract voidable, but superior
knowledge about the parties' asymmetric access to information
38
about the subject of exchange. Importantly, focusing the ethical
analysis on one of these forms of asymmetry at the expense of the
other does not change the outcome of that analysis. Within the
closed universe of a bilateral contract, forbidding a party from
knowingly taking advantage of his counterparty's lack of
information about the parties' asymmetric access to knowledge
does not change the distribution of information about the subject of
exchange. Conversely, allowing a party to take advantage of his
counterparty's inferior information about the parties' access to
knowledge will not necessarily increase, and may in fact decrease,
the flow of information about the subject of exchange-again
within the closed universe of a bilateral contract. It is thus
unsurprising that the consequentialist and deontological
n Compare supra note 35 and sources cited therein with supra note 36 and sources
cited therein.
38 See Scheppele, supra note 34, at 162-63.
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approaches to asymmetric information in contract law are
essentially consistent.
The same cannot be said for insider trading. In the securities
context, again, it is not the fact that an insider has material non-
public information that is said to be problematic, but the fact that
the insider enters into a transaction with someone whom he knows
lacks access to that information due to some pre-existing
relationship. 39  Where we are dealing with an exchange-based
securities transaction, however, blocking the transaction based on
asymmetric information about the asymmetric knowledge of the
parties to the trade has the effect of blocking the dissemination of
information about the subject of exchange to third parties, insofar
as that information is conveyed primarily through the price paid for
a security traded over an exchange. 40 To a deontologist, this effect
is of no moment, but to a consequentialist, it is has great
significance for the efficiency of the market (and thus the welfare
of market participants) going forward.
Thus, the conflict between ethical systems that arises as we
move from the bilateral contract to the exchange-based trade can
be seen as a question of priorities. While the consequentialist
system seems to view the dissemination of information about the
3 Scheppele, supra note 34, at 162-63. The requirement of some preexisting duty of
a Section 1Ob-5 defendant to his or her counterparty under current law stems from the
Supreme Court's efforts to limit Section lOb-5 liability to corporate insiders and
fiduciaries. See generally United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (validating the
"misappropriation" theory of lob-5 liability, under which the defendant may be held
liable for trading on information in violation of a duty to the source of that information);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that Section lOb-5 is not
violated when the party with inside information owes no independent duty to disclose to
his counterparty, for example, as a fiduciary of the counterparty). These authorities layer
an additional element onto the insider trading analysis beyond the mere use of material
inside information in trading, which had prevailed under earlier precedent. See generally
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968); see also Chiarella 445 U.S. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I do not agree that
a failure to disclose violates [Rule lob-5] only when the responsibilities of a relationship
of that kind have been breached. As applied to this case, the Court's approach unduly
minimizes the importance of petitioner's access to confidential information that the
honest investor, no matter how diligently he tried, could not legally obtain.").




subject of exchange as paramount,4 1 the deontological system
focuses on how we use information we have about one another in
42
our interactions. I propose that this difference, more than
anything else, explains the disparity between deontological and
consequentialist conclusions regarding insider trading, and the
difference between those conclusions and the conclusions of the
same ethical systems regarding mistake in contract law.
III. THE ETHICS OF UNBRANDING
A similar set of information asymmetries arises in the
unbranding context. Trademark law generally applies to consumer
markets, which occupy an intermediate space between the bilateral
dealings that we generally think of as being the subject of
commercial contract law and the broad, liquid, and impersonal
markets that we find in the context of securities law. Consumer
markets also have a unique characteristic: sellers virtually always
have superior information to buyers, 4 3 in a way that we wouldn't
necessarily expect would predictably be the case in bilateral
commercial contracts or in securities markets. Moreover, in
consumer markets, sellers also tend to have superior information
about buyers' product knowledge and decision-making processes.
Indeed, the entire discipline of marketing can be understood as an
effort to improve sellers' understanding of how brands influence
consumer knowledge, beliefs, and behavior-and to use that better
understanding to improve sellers' profits.44 In short, trademark
41 This preference appears to be motivated by the effect of dissemination of
information about the subject of exchange on the efficiency of the market in question. See
supra note 36.
42 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. This preference appears to be based
on a respect for personal autonomy and the moral value of consent. See, e.g., FRIED,
supra note 34, at 81-85 (a consent-type argument based on the need to fulfill reasonable
expectations); Scheppele, supra note 34, at 162-63 (a Rawlsian argument based on
implied consent); Strudler & Orts, supra note 34, at 413-17 (an autonomy-based
argument).
43 Economides, supra note 23, at 526-27; cf generally George A. Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.
488 (1970).
4 I have previously written about the ability and incentive this superior understanding
gives brand owners to take advantage of consumers in potentially welfare-reducing ways.
See generally Sheff, supra note 19. For altemative takes on the relative sophistication of
consumers and producers with respect to trademark-influenced consumer decision-
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law seems to present a similar dilemma to the securities context: if
we restrict the uses to which trademark owners can put their
superior knowledge about consumer knowledge and decision-
making processes, we may jeopardize the dissemination of
information about trademarked products themselves.45 The
question then arises: which is the more important value in terms of
the ethics of trademark law?
A. The Consequentialist Case
We could begin an answer to this question with the observation
that unbranding is a modem phenomenon, and modem trademark
theory is largely consequentialist in its approach. Prevailing theory
tells us that trademark protection-the exclusive right to use a
particular source identifier and to prevent others from using it-
encourages the efficient transfer of accurate product information
from seller to buyer.46 It has help in this regard from false
advertising law, which prohibits dissemination of false or
misleading product information to potential buyers.47 In this view
the trademark itself is information about the subject of exchange,
and preserving the integrity of that information while ensuring its
efficient dissemination is the fundamental purpose of trademark
law. Trademark protection is thus a means, not an end. The end of
trademark protection, in this account, is a marketplace flush with
goods of reliably consistent quality, that are easy to identify and
distinguish, where producers compete vigorously on quality and
price, consumers can satisfy their preferences, transaction costs are
minimized, and aggregate social welfare is maximized as a
result. 48  Practices that interfere with the attainment of these
ends-by giving consumers bad information, or making it harder
making, see generally Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 2020 (2005); Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture
Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REv. 99 (2010).
45 Cf Beebe, supra note 44, at 2066 ("The tradeoff between information and
persuasion described above goes far towards explaining one dynamic that has driven the
expansion of trademark scope since the beginning of the twentieth century. At the heart
of this dynamic is the trademark producer's willingness to assume the costs of search in
order to gain the benefits of persuasion.").
46 See supra note 23 and sources cited therein.
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
48 See supra note 23 and sources cited therein.
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for producers of quality products to inform consumers about that
quality-are wrongful, as a legal and, we might say, an ethical
matter.
1. Concealment Unbranding
There is a plausible argument that concealment unbranding is
problematic under this consequentialist account of trademark law.
Concealment unbranding can be said to reduce consumer
information and to increase information asymmetry, at least about
the unbranded product or service. The practice takes away
information that the consumer had come to rely on in evaluating
products sold under the now-concealed trademark. In this view,
unbranding, like false advertising or passing off, looks like a kind
of misrepresentation. This is the basis on which other
commentators have criticized this first species of unbranding as
wrongful.49
But perhaps this condemnation of concealment unbranding is
unwarranted. After all, trademark law countenances depriving
consumers of information in other contexts. For example,
trademark licensing-which was once thought to be a heinous
form of consumer deceptionso-is unremarkable today,51 although
naked licensing doctrine puts some limits on the extent to which
licensing can take away relevant information from a consumer. 52
Likewise, assignment of a mark can change relevant facts about
the source of a branded good, yet it is tolerated, subject to the
limits imposed by the prohibition against assignments in gross.5 3
And of course, a producer is free to change the formulation of a
49 See generally Perzanowski, supra note 2; Matos, supra note 2.
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 cmt. a (1995) ("The historical
conception of trademarks as symbols indicating the physical source of the goods led a
number of early courts to conclude that the owner of a trademark could not license others
to use the mark without destroying the significance of the designation as an indication of
source. Licenses were sometimes declared invalid as a fraud on the public, and licensors
risked forfeiture of their rights in the mark through a finding of abandonment.").
51 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006).
52 Id.; see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d
Cir. 1959) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("Without the requirement of control, the right of a
trademark owner to license his mark separately from the business in connection with
which it has been used would create the danger that products bearing the same trademark
might be of diverse qualities.").
5 15 U.S.C. § 1060.
2011]) 997
FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 21:983
product, in ways that may not be readily detectable to consumers,
without changing the trademark that consumers rely on for
information about the altered product.54 In each of these
situations, a producer is changing the state of affairs that
consumers have relied on in potentially misleading ways. Given
that trademark law tolerates these practices, any ethical analysis
will have to explain why unbranding should be treated any
differently.
One potential explanation may be found by looking at the mark
owner's incentives. As Landes and Posner point out, the threat of
retaliation by consumers may well lead trademark owners to
refrain from licensing or selling their trademarks to unreliable
parties, or from significantly reducing the quality of goods bearing
their marks, at least where the mark owner intends to continue as a
going concern. 5 We might therefore ask whether concealment
unbranding presents trademark owners with similar incentives.
This is a complex question, which again leads us to the second
form of information asymmetry discussed in the previous Part. As
noted above, trademark owners, by virtue of their marketing
research efforts, virtually always have more information about
consumer knowledge, beliefs, and behaviors than consumers
themselves do.56 This superior knowledge puts trademark owners
in a unique position to ensure the flow of accurate information in
the marketplace, and more importantly, to stanch the flow of
inaccurate information.
To take just one example of this dynamic, I have previously
written about how difficult it can be to dislodge consumer product
beliefs. Importantly, this "stickiness" of consumer beliefs may
prevail regardless of whether the consumer belief is accurate or
inaccurate, even in the face of contradictory consumer experience
with the branded product.5s This feature of consumer decision-
making-well known to and frequently manipulated by
54 See generally J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31
CARDOZO L. REv. 327 (2009).
5 See Landes & Posner, supra note 23, at 284-87.
56 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
s7 See Sheff, supra note 22, at 1287-95.
58 Sheff, supra note 22, at 1290-95.
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marketerS59 -complicates our consequentialist analysis. For
example, consider the 15th Street Coffee and Tea Company.60 it
may be that Starbucks provides a poor quality product and poor
quality service, and that consumers are perfectly justified in
avoiding its coffeehouses. But that might not be the case. It might
be that Starbucks has developed a poor reputation based on
mistaken rumor, or based on cultural biases that lead consumers to
avoid learning about the high quality of the company's products or
services, or by random chance. In the latter circumstance, putting
Starbucks to the burden of mounting a consumer re-education
campaign in order to correct the mistaken beliefs of the consuming
public could be wasteful. It might be easier (that is, more efficient)
to give consumers an accurate impression of the company and its
products or services by simply starting over with a new brand.
Thus, when we talk about the ethics of concealment
unbranding from a consequentialist perspective, it may be useful to
distinguish between two possible forms of the behavior. One form
seeks to efficiently correct mistaken consumer beliefs about a
product-we might call it "corrective concealment unbranding."
The other form seeks to neutralize accurate consumer beliefs about
a product or service-we might call it "deceptive concealment
unbranding." The latter, from a consequentialist ethical
perspective, would be blameworthy, the former praiseworthy, to
the extent that we view one of the ends of the trademark system as
being the satisfaction of consumer preferences.
Once we accept this distinction, the ethics of concealment
unbranding generally must be seen as contingent on various factors
that might make the prevalence of one or the other form of the
behavior more likely. One such factor is market incentives. Of
course, permitting concealment unbranding at all provides
trademark owners the potential opportunity to change consumer
associations with their product or service while continuing in
59 Sheff, supra note 22, at 1295-97.
60 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. In presenting this talk at Fordham Law
School, I relied instead on the example of Philip Morris's rebranding as Altria. As if to
prove the point that rebranding can be an efficient way of changing consumer beliefs, I
literally forgot what the predecessor brand to Altria was, and had to be reminded by a
member of the audience.
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business, without any ill effects for the concealed brand. As a
result, the market discipline that we rely on in the licensing,
assignment, and product reformulation context is likely sufficient
to cause trademark owners to engage in corrective concealment
unbranding, but insufficient to cause them to eschew deceptive
concealment unbranding.
But even this general statement about incentives is potentially
overbroad. The market incentives under discussion depend on the
threat of consumer retaliation. As noted above, there is some
debate over the ability of consumers to see through marketing
efforts,6 1 and it may be that even a clever instance of deceptive
concealment unbranding will be revealed in time-as the examples
discussed in this Essay have already been. Thus, market incentives
alone may well be sufficient to deter deceptive concealment
unbranding, but whether this will be the case depends on the nature
and sophistication of the relevant consuming public and the ease of
acquiring information about the source of the unbranded product
from somewhere other than the brand itself.
Finally, to the extent we would look to courts rather than the
market to sort desirable corrective concealment unbranding from
undesirable deceptive concealment unbranding, we are inviting a
new category of enforcement costs into our consumer markets.62
To the extent that the ultimate good that our consequentialist
account of trademark law seeks to promote is the efficiency of
consumer markets, these added enforcement costs would have to
be weighed against the benefit gained by preventing deceptive
concealment unbranding. Once again, this is a fundamentally
contingent empirical question.
In sum, the consequentialist approach to concealment
unbranding does not lend itself to generalizable ethical
conclusions. And of course, this must be true of any ethical system
that looks to the consequences of a class of behavior that may be
motivated by various factors and directed at diverse targets. This
does not mean that the law should not take these empirically
61 See supra notes 43-44 and sources cited therein.
62 See generally Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA.
L. REv. 2099 (2004).
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contingent ethical considerations into account. On the contrary,
the doctrines discussed in Part II above-and particularly the
contract law example-demonstrate that courts are frequently
called upon to sort sheep from goats based on precisely these types
of fact-intensive ethical inquiries. Whether they should do so in
the unbranding context is a question that cannot be answered-
from a consequentialist perspective-in the abstract.
2. Sabotage Unbranding
In my view, the sabotage unbranding scenario presents far less
ambiguity from a consequentialist perspective. I would go so far
as to say that a consequentialist ethical approach to trademark law
should view sabotage unbranding as an almost unmitigated good.
To understand why, we must be careful to situate sabotage
unbranding in the context in which we find it: the market for
luxury brands and status goods.
I argue in a forthcoming article that luxury brands-what I
have referred to as "Veblen Brands"-are fundamentally different
from other types of trademarks. 63 Whereas in all other areas of
trademark law we rely on trademarks to provide information about
the products bearing them, in the luxury goods context we rely on
trademarks to provide information about the people who consume
64them. Consumers of such goods care less about the actual
features of the product than about the product's social
connotations. Absent extremely broad notions of intellectual
property rights, these social connotations-with the exception of
65price-remain largely outside of the producer's control. Rather,
they depend entirely on what types of people are known to
consume the product. This being the case, markets for status
goods may be the only type of consumer markets where buyers are
at no significant informational disadvantage relative to sellers
63 See generally Sheff, supra note 19.
6 Sheff, supra note 19, Part II.
65 See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV.
L. REv. 809, 840-47 (2010) (discussing the bulwark that "sumptuary intellectual property
law" throws up against the socially de-differentiating "ideology of the copy"); cf PAUL
FUSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS SYSTEM 172 (Touchstone ed.
1992) (1983) ("Prole Drift, we can call it, a term that will suggest the tendency in
advanced industrialized societies for everything inexorably to become proletarianized.").
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regarding the subject matter of exchange: a signal of social
status.66
Thus, when we ask whether sabotage unbranding is wrongful
from a consequentialist perspective, we must ask whether it
reduces the production or dissemination of information regarding
the type of people who consume the branded product. I submit
that it does precisely the opposite. When Coach (or Louis Vuitton,
or Prada) gives legitimately purchased, genuine Gucci handbags to
Snooki in the hopes that she is the type of person who will
conspicuously consume a Gucci bag, and she then does so, these
competitors of Gucci are creating relevant and accurate
information about the Gucci mark. That this information might not
be the kind of information that Gucci particularly wants to be
disseminated does not render it false or misleading. To argue that
it is would be to argue that nobody could ever purchase a genuine
Gucci handbag to be given as a gift unless Gucci approved the
recipient as a worthy representative of its brand-a position that
even Gucci surely would not take. Rather, the antipathy of the
targets of sabotage unbranding toward the practice more likely
merely reflects their resentment of the fundamental truth of status
good markets: beyond the ability to set a price, such markets give
sellers no special informational advantage over buyers regarding
the subject matter of exchange.
To the extent there is still something about the sabotage
unbranding scenario that troubles us, then, our misgivings are
likely to be grounded in a deontological ethical perspective. Let us
therefore consider whether such a perspective leads to a different
assessment of the ethical status of unbranding.
B. The Deontological Case
As discussed in the previous Part, deontological analysis of
market relationships may be said to turn on the degree of
information asymmetry between market actors with respect to the
knowledge, position, and decision-making processes of their
66 , Sheff, supra note 19, Part II.C; see generally J. Shahar Dilbary, Famous




counterparties.67 We might say that any effort to take advantage of
such asymmetric information between buyers and sellers is a
violation of some kind of ethical duty, insofar as it interferes with
the disadvantaged party's autonomy. While the concept of
autonomy is too complex and contested to be thoroughly explored
here, I will propose a working definition for present purposes
that I intend to expand upon in future work. I propose that
consumer autonomy can be understood as the right and ability of
the consumer to make a purchasing decision under conditions
where the consumer both determines and more or less accurately
understands the reasons for his or her choice. Under this
definition, we might consider consumer autonomy to have been
violated where a seller manipulates the consumer's decision-
making process using knowledge about that process that the
consumer lacks in order to influence that process in ways that the
consumer is unlikely to be able to detect. In Kantian terms, we
might say that sellers who engage in such practices are treating
consumers as means, rather than as ends. 69
Sabotage unbranding appears to be this kind of ethical breach.
The perpetrators of such practices are fully aware of the basis for
consumer decision-making in status goods markets.70  They use
this knowledge to selectively give consumers knowledge that will
inure to the perpetrators' competitive benefit (e.g., Snooki is a
Gucci girl), while withholding additional information that would
reveal to the consumer the basis for her own decision-making in a
way that the perpetrators' know might blunt or reverse that benefit
(e.g., social signals built on conspicuous consumption of brands
are so fragile that Coach felt the need to give Snooki a free Gucci
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 31, § 153(b) (1981).
68 GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988) ("[The term
'autonomy'] is sometimes used as an equivalent of liberty, . . . sometimes equivalent to
self-rule or sovereignty, sometimes equated with freedom of the will. It is equated with
dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is
identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from
obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's own interests...
. About the only features held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a
feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.").
69 KANT, supra note 9, at 35-36.
70 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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bag in the hopes she would stop carrying her Coach bag). 7 If we
view such active manipulation of consumers' knowledge and
decision-making processes as wrongful,72 we would have to
condemn sabotage unbranding.
Similarly, in the case of concealment unbranding, brand
owners are using their understanding of consumer knowledge and
decision-making process to manipulate the flow of information
about the subject matter of exchange in such a way as to gain some
sort of advantage. In this case, it is the "stickiness" of consumer
beliefs that is particularly known to sellers, and unbranding seeks
to circumvent this feature of consumer decision-making without
the consumer detecting the reasons for their changed decisions. 73
Under the definition proposed above, we would consider this to be
a violation of consumer autonomy, and therefore wrongful.
Importantly, the deontological view does not condition ethical
condemnation of concealment unbranding on the corrective or
deceptive nature of the practice. 74 Rather, it is the practice itself,
and its interference with consumer autonomy,75 that is wrongful.
Thus, a deontological perspective would likely categorically
condemn concealment unbranding as well.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the practice of unbranding squarely presents a conflict
of ethical systems. While both forms of the practice are likely
blameworthy from a deontological perspective, sabotage
unbranding does not seem to present serious ethical concerns from
a consequentialist perspective, and the ethical implications of
concealment unbranding are mixed at worst. We thus return to the
question that began this Essay: which ethical system is most
appropriately applied to unbranding in particular and trademark
law in general?
7 See supra Part III.A.2.
72 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
" See supra Part III.A. 1.
74 Cf supra Part III.A. 1.
5 Cf supra notes 42, 68-69 and accompanying text.
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Many commentators, including myself, have argued that
deontological justifications for many forms of intellectual property
rights are essentially circular. 76 But these critiques are typically
leveled against theories grounded in misappropriation and the
moral claims of labor, rather than theories grounded in the
principle of autonomy. On the latter class of theories, the scholarly
literature is somewhat underdeveloped, but potentially less
hostile. 7
It should be noted, however, how novel-even radical-such
an autonomy-focused deontological theory of trademark would
be. A principle that sellers in consumer markets may not use
their superior knowledge of consumer decision-making processes
to clandestinely influence consumer behavior would proscribe
many modem advertising and marketing practices. Moreover,
there is no real precedent for imposing a duty on sellers to respect
the autonomy of buyers in consumer markets, at least as I have
defined autonomy. Even the historical deontological model of
trademark law discussed in the first Part of this Essay is generally
unconcerned with the duties owed by sellers to buyers. Rather, it
looks to sellers' duties to each other-buyers are essentially the
evidence, not the victim. 79  If we were to examine unbranding
under this historical model, we would likely be right back at the
circular, misappropriation-based theories that have drawn such (in
my view, warranted) skepticism. Thus, an ethical framework that
would reliably deem unbranding wrongful would require a
significant shift in our thinking about the subject.
This is not to say that an autonomy-based deontological theory
of trademark law is wrong, just that it is unusual. Contemporary
trademark theory, having succumbed to the totalizing logic of
economic analysis, is far more comfortable with consequentialist
76 Sheff, supra note 19, Part III.C.1; see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 19, at
181-84; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 400-12 (1990); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815
(1935).
7 See generally Heymann, supra note 25.
78 See Heymann, supra note 25, at 702-14 (discussing various expansionary
trademark doctrines that would have to be retrenched under a theoretical perspective
based on consumer autonomy).
7 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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approaches to novel problems.8 0  And the consequentialist
approach generates comforting results in the unbranding context.
By and large, the market is presumed to know best, and
unbranding does not threaten to disturb that conclusion to any great
degree. Frankly, my personal sympathies continue to lie with the
consequentialist camp. Still, to the extent that something about
unbranding continues to irritate our ethical organ, it may suggest
that our reliance on consequentialist thinking in trademark law is in
some way misplaced, or at least incomplete.
so See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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